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Abstract: 
This essay explores an emergent black atheist, secular humanist, and naturalistic imagination. 
Based on a 2007 survey by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life that measured the 
percentage of African Americans holding such views, I refer to this group as “one percenters.” 
Broadly speaking, one percenters view human nature and destiny (necessity and historical 
contingency) through an anthropological rather than a theological lens. As three perspectives on 
the same phenomenon, they are the dialectical other of theism and conventional forms of 
religion. In all three cases, negating theism does “positive” productive and creative work, 
energizing a different kind of affirmation. Nuances in rhetoric, emotional color, and practical 
engagement with religious cultures and institutions create distinctions among atheists, secular 
humanists, and naturalists that are more than merely artful and stylized. These nuances reveal 
different understandings of what nonbelief entails in matters of conduct and whether the negative 
and epistemic category of “nonbelief” properly describes their difference from theists. 
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Article: 
Religion is the love of life in the consciousness of impotence.— George Santayana, The 
Works of George Santayana 
In this essay, I trace some milestones of an emerging black atheist, secular humanist, and 
naturalistic imagination. Based on “A Religious Portrait of African Americans,” a 2007 survey 
by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life that characterizes atheists and agnostics as 1 
percent of the black population (Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2009), I call the 
subjects of this essay “one percenters.” This term signifies on the Five Percenters, the Nation of 
Earths and Gods, which split from the Nation of Islam in 1963. I claim that atheism, secular 
humanism, and naturalism represent three perspectives on the same phenomenon. As the 
dialectical other of theism, they constitute a kind of religious phenomenon (at least in the 
“binding together” etymology of the word religion). In all three cases, negating theism does 
productive and creative work, energizing a different kind of affirmation. Nuances in rhetoric, 
emotional color, and practical engagement with religious cultures and institutions create 
distinctions among atheists, secular humanists, and naturalists that are more than merely artful 
and stylized. These nuances reveal different understandings of what nonbelief entails in matters 
of conduct and whether “nonbelief” is a proper way of describing their difference from theists. 
Not much of a prognosticator, I prefer to predict the future after it has already happened. 
However, if I were to hazard a guess about the future of black religion, I could not imagine it 
without according a more prominent role to one percenters. 
Early Twentieth-Century Figures 
In the early twentieth century, before and during World War I, Hubert Harrison was widely 
known as “the father of Harlem radicalism”: 
His views on race and class profoundly influenced a generation of New Negro militants, 
including class-radical socialists A. Philip Randolph and Chandler Owen, the future 
communists Cyril Briggs and Richard B. Moore, and the race-radical Marcus Garvey. 
Considered more race conscious than Randolph and Owen and more class conscious than 
Garvey, Harrison is the key link in the ideological unity of the two great trends of the 
Black Liberation Movement—the labor and civil rights trend associated with Martin 
Luther King Jr., and the race and nationalist trend associated with Malcolm X. (Randolph 
and Garvey were, respectively, the direct links to King marching on Washington, with 
Randolph at his side, and to Malcolm, whose father was a Garveyite preacher and whose 
mother was a writer for Garvey’s Negro World, speaking militantly and proudly on 
Harlem’s Lenox Avenue.) (Perry 2009: 5) 
Like other black notables in the first decades of the twentieth century— including A. J. Rogers, 
George S. Schuyler, Claude McKay, Walter E. Hawkins, Hodge Kirnon, Rothschild Francis, and 
W. E. B. Du Bois—Harrison was “influenced by freethought or atheism” (Perry 2009: 115). As 
skeptics, these figures were suspicious of the all-pervasive black church culture that Du Bois 
described in The Souls of Black Folk. They pursued political affiliations and modes of thinking 
such as the “freethought movement” that offered critically inflected freedom. Harrison’s 
freethought was related to his interest in Darwinian evolutionary theory. Though a proponent, he 
was not uncritical. He recognized the ways that many of his socialist allies endorsed racist 
interpretations of evolutionary theory (Perry 2009: 118–19). Harrison remarked: “The 
conception now prevailing that white people are superior and darker people inferior arose as the 
mental reflex of a social fact. 
That fact was the military and political dominations exercised by European whites over the 
darker people who as late as the fourteenth century had been superior to them” (quoted in Perry 
2009: 118–19). While Harrison’s Darwinism came with a good dose of Lamarckism (the notion 
that acquired characteristics are heritable), he regarded races, in contemporary jargon, as social 
kinds rather than natural kinds (Perry 2009: 122).1 The same freethought orientation that 
encompasses Harrison’s Darwinism also illuminated his opposition to the tax-exempt status of 
churches, which he expressed in a newspaper article titled “The Menace of Exemption” 
(Harrison 1911, quoted in Perry 2009: 136). Offering an internal critique based on the narrative 
logic of Christian scripture, he argued that Jesus’s ethic did not support exemption. He 
augmented this claim with an external critique of the alleged social benefits of exemption. He 
regarded tax exemption as a net loss both economically and socially. Given the cultural and 
political salience of the church among African Americans, Harrison’s jaundiced view of 
religious institutions, especially the church, undermined his prospects as a mass leader (Perry 
2009: 136–37). 
Agnostic as a matter of epistemology, atheist as a matter of belief, Harrison was an archetypical 
“New Negro.” In The Negro’s God as Reflected in His Literature, Benjamin E. Mays (1968) 
lamented the growing irreligion of this cohort of Blackamericans (militant advocates of black 
liberation). Addressing sympathetic white liberals, Mays issued the following jeremiad: “unless 
liberal prophetic religion moves more progressively to the left in the effort to achieve complete 
citizenship rights for the Negro, he will become more irreligious and he will become more 
militant and communistic in his efforts to attain to full manhood in American life” (Mays 1968: 
244). In support of his claim, Mays cited several examples: Countee Cullen’s “Heritage,” “The 
Black Christ,” and other poems; the novels of Du Bois, including Darkwater; Nella Larsen’s 
Quicksand; Walter White, Fire in the Flint; and Jessie Redmond Fauset, Plum Bum. In addition, 
he cited James Weldon Johnson’s autobiography, Along This Way, George S. Schuyler’s explicit 
confession that “I am an atheist,” and Langston Hughes—“easily the most Communistic of the 
writers used in this study” (Mays 1968: 219–220, 225–228, 234, 237, 239). This list of writers, 
scholars, and activists is a “Who’s Who” of black America. Notice how Mays correlates 
irreligion, militancy, and communism, as well as impiety and political radicalism. With minor 
qualifications, this is a good description of Harrison: antireligious, militant race man, radical 
socialist. Though Mays did not mention him, Harrison fits the description of those African 
Americans (the New Negroes) who “doubt God’s value,” regard God as dead (a fairytale that 
once upon a time was useful, but no longer is), and those who deny the very existence of God 
(Mays 1968: 218). 
The Academic Discourse of Secular Humanism 
As the dialectical other (the negative) of black theists and religionists traditionally defined, one 
percenters—atheists, secular humanists, and naturalists—are typically excluded from black 
religious studies. William R. Jones and Anthony B. Pinn are the leading African American 
secular humanists. Through a rigorous philosophical critique of contemporary black theologians, 
Jones provides a paradigm for an African American secular humanism. As a dialectical response 
to Jones’s model, Pinn translates a philosophical critique of black theology into a theological 
critique of black theism. As with all translations, something is lost. The argumentative rigor of 
Jones’s account does not survive nor does the existential urgency. Jones wrote in the wake of the 
civil rights and Black Power movements. Revolution was in the air, revolutionaries in the streets. 
In this revolutionary situation, the rhetoric of analysts matched the fervor of the revolutionaries. 
Though more restrained than many, Jones’s rhetoric exhibits this fervor. Pinn wrote after the 
Reagan counterrevolution, the antiblack backlash, and the ascendency of neoliberalism, the 
achievements of which were consolidated by George H. W. Bush and William Jefferson Clinton. 
This was a period of retreat. The writings of Jones and Pinn reflect these contextual differences 
and divergent historical conjunctures. 
Divine Racism as the Reductio ad absurdum of Black Theism 
Jones’s Is God a White Racist? is the first significant effort after Mays to write one percenters 
into black religious studies. Jones’s method includes a reductio ad absurdum argument. Such an 
argument seeks to undermine claims by showing the absurd consequences of taking them 
seriously. Jones argues that black theological claims—that black suffering, neither redemptive 
nor deserved, violates God’s justice and will; that God vindicates the oppressed, among whom 
black people are prototypes, through historical acts of liberation; that God is black—lead to the 
conclusion that the God of black liberation is a white racist (Jones 1998). The intentions of black 
theologians notwithstanding, their claims lead to this conclusion. So how does Jones reach his 
conclusion? 
First, it is important to understand what he is not doing: making a reductio ad impossibile 
argument, providing an irrefutable argument in support of the claim that God is a white racist, 
knocking down any argument against his claim through the sheer power of the principle of 
noncontradiction. Jones does not want the claim that God is a white racist to prevail. Rather, his 
reductio ad absurdum of black theology is a plea for reformation. He wants black theologians to 
revise their claims about God to make them less vulnerable to the very notion of divine racism. 
Jones is a secular humanist who has resigned himself to the likelihood that the black multitude 
will not embrace his perspective any time soon. Short of such an embrace, Jones seeks to 
persuade black theologians, insofar as they are thought leaders among black theists, to adopt a 
form of theism less vulnerable to the charge of divine racism under whose terms the question “Is 
God a white racist?” is unlikely to arise. He knows that the most effective approach and 
potentially the most devastating is an internal critique: an analysis of the basic assumptions held 
by black theologians, a reductio ad absurdum account that reveals ethical-political quietism as 
the consequence of the liberation ethic of black theologians. 
The intrinsic goodness of God represents the infra-assumption of black theology, the assumption 
beneath the assumptions Jones makes explicit. This infrared assumption, so to speak, lies on a 
part of the theological spectrum that is usually invisible and thus unrecognized as subject to 
skeptical questioning. Jones uses two concepts to challenge this assumption: “God as the Sum of 
His Acts” and the “multievidentiality of suffering” (Jones 1998: 11, 15). The upshot of the 
challenge is this: suffering can be evidence for a good God or a demonic God; Golgotha may 
reveal a self-sacrificial God or the torturer-in-chief. The evidence is inherently ambiguous. Jones 
argues: “Though black suffering may raise the question of divine racism or malevolence, the 
answer cannot be determined by an examination of the suffering alone” (Jones 1998: 9). But 
what happens when we regard God as the sum of his acts? This standard of evaluation jettisons 
the infra-assumption regarding God’s intrinsic goodness, predicating conclusions about “Who 
God is on the basis of what He has done for black people” (14). If God is what God does, if God 
liberates black people, then history should bear witness to God’s acts of liberation. With the 
biblical Exodus as the model, where God liberates Hebrew slaves from Egyptian bondage, Jones 
argues that one finds no comparable exaltation event, a historical reversal of black peoples’ 
collective misfortune. To appeal, as some black theologians do, to a future act of liberation 
signals nothing less than desperation. Desperation is also evident in James H. Cone’s response to 
Jones’s criticism. Faced with the devastating consequences of Jones’s reductio, Cone resorts to a 
decidedly traditional, question-begging, and nonrevolutionary account where Jesus’s life, death, 
and resurrection are the event of black liberation.2 With this tepid conclusion one must resist the 
signs of boredom, the temptation to blink and yawn; one wonders what all the fuss and hyperbole 
regarding liberation is about. Jones’s reduction smokes out Cone and other would-be theological 
revolutionaries and sends them scurrying toward a traditional theological bunker. The door of 
that bunker has closed and rusted. 
This retreat to tradition and convention must have disappointed Jones. The point of his critique is 
to goad black theologians toward a theological model that makes good on their liberationist aims 
by avoiding the ethical-political quietism inherent in their claims regarding the nature of God. As 
a via media between traditional theism from which Jones sought to wean black theologians and 
the secular humanism he hoped they might eventually embrace, humanocentric theism 
constituted an effort to split the difference. But the difference would be split in such a way that 
the liberation interests of black people would be served. Insofar as there are intentional agencies 
in the world, humanocentric theism affirms the functional ultimacy of humans. Human choices 
and their consequences reign supreme. Human co-creative power constrains divine agency. God 
exercises persuasive rather than coercive power. Divine purposes do not predetermine human 
destiny (Jones 1998: 187–88, 191–92). While acknowledging that “humanocentric theism does 
not honor every pressing demand of a contemporary black theodicy,” Jones contends that it 
addresses the major issues: eliminating the specter of divine racism and devitalizing the impulse 
toward ethical-political quietism (186). 
As a secular humanist, Jones is less interested in debunking theism in the manner of the “New 
Atheists” than defanging it. This strategy to live, defang, and let live is one mode of self-
presentation among one percenters. By providing the outline of an alternative, humanocentric 
approach to theism, Jones attempts to mitigate the ethical-political dangers of traditional 
theocentric forms. This underscores the live, defang, and let live strategy. Jones’s motives are 
predominately ethical-political rather than epistemic. Though Jones may share the epistemic-
driven exasperation of those who seek to debunk theism, he subordinates this desire to the ends 
of liberation. He recognizes that theism is hegemonic among Blackamericans, so humanocentric 
theism is a strategy in a “war of position” whose ultimate aim is the cultural hegemony of secular 
humanism. Jones does not use this Gramscian language, but I think that this is a fair account of 
his view. 
Consolidating and Extending Jones’s Legacy 
Jones is the pivotal one percenter. Anyone writing about African American humanism after him 
does so under the immense shadow of his influence. Beginning with his first monograph Why 
Lord? Suffering and Evil in Black Theology, Anthony Pinn has struggled to develop his own 
voice. Pinn pursues a “one-up” strategy vis-à-vis Jones, as if to say, “I’ll take your point about 
black theism, ethical-political quietism, and secular humanism and raise you one.”3 Pinn draws 
an invidious contrast between his “strong humanism” and the “weak humanism” of Jones, which 
he allegedly shares with Delores Williams, Cornel West, and others (Pinn 1995: 141–45). Weak 
humanists are ambiguous and ambivalent regarding the existence of God. Untroubled in this 
way, strong humanists confront human suffering directly and more effectively. If Pinn presents 
himself as a more consistent and thus radical exponent of secular humanism, then Jones 
epitomizes a kind of halfhearted humanist, one who “pulls his punches.” Does this presentation 
accurately represent matters, or does Pinn engage in a bit of misreading, if not sleight-of-hand? 
On my view, Pinn does not grasp Jones’s rhetorical strategy of internal critique and reductio ad 
absurdum. He seems not to understand the relationship between this mode of argument and 
Jones’s secular humanist ends. This discursive mismatch between Jones’s philosophical analysis 
of suffering in black theology and Pinn’s theological account of that analysis produces a 
misreading. Pinn commits an error that Sherman Jackson (2009) replicates in his comparative 
study of black suffering in Islam and Christianity. Both take humanocentric theism as Jones’s 
normative view when in fact it is a strategic via media, a Deweyan end-in-view, the ultimate end 
of which is secular humanism. In short Pinn and Jackson read Jones as if he were a theologian 
rather than a secular humanist philosopher who presents an internal critique of theological 
discourse to achieve a specific end. Pinn does not recognize the extent to which his distinction 
between strong and weak humanism mimics Jones’s distinction between secular humanism and 
humanocentric theism. To put it bluntly, Pinn appropriates Jones’s distinction between types of 
humanism without attribution. Jones clearly describes secular humanism as his normative view. 
“Strong misreadings” are part of the engine that makes criticism run. Pinn’s Bloomesque 
misreading of Jones empowers his own account of humanism. 
If Jones’s principal strategy regarding theism is live, defang, and let live, then Pinn seeks to 
debunk and root out. It is important to understand the relativity of this distinction. As a matter of 
sheer debunking virtuosity, Pinn does not approach Jones’s level. However, as I read them, 
debunking theism—that is, an epistemically driven desire to take down theism— motivates Pinn 
more powerfully than it does Jones. Where debunking constitutes Pinn’s principal aim, Jones’s 
debunking work subserves his ethical-political aims. In comparison, Pinn’s ethical-political aims 
are muted. Again, I offer this distinction as relative rather than absolute. 
I claim that Pinn’s chief conceptual contribution to African American secular humanism lies, to 
use a hip-hop metaphor, in “sampling and remixing” Jones’s secular humanist/humanocentric 
theist distinction. The result is Pinn’s distinction between strong and weak humanism. But his 
importance rests less in his conceptual innovations than in his role as the chief disseminator of 
secular humanist ideas among African Americans. Pinn’s canvas is broad: theology, folklore, 
literature, and the culture of popular music. He traces the way individuals in these varied cultural 
sites represent black suffering, teases out intimations of atheism extending back to slavery 
(protoversions), and argues for a forthright embrace of atheism as the preferable option for black 
people. Pinn uses the biblical character Nimrod as a trope for African American humanists. This 
Promethean figure defies the biblical god. Drawing on biblical genealogies and popular belief, 
Pinn plays with the notion that Nimrod is a black man. As a myth, Nimrod can do for black 
secular humanists “what Prometheus has done for their white fellow travelers” (Pinn 2004: 5). 
As a prolific scholar and tireless exponent of the one percent, Pinn has done more than anyone to 
give this group of African Americans a recognizable face. Among an impressive list of texts, his 
contributions include Terror and Triumph: The Nature of Black Religion (2003), Noise and 
Spirit: The Religious and Spiritual Sensibilities of Rap Music (2003), and African American 
Religious Life and the Story of Nimrod (2007). Whether single authored, cowritten, or an edited 
volume, Pinn’s body of work is a milestone in one percenter thought. 
Pinn has the distinction of having written the first systematic nontheistic African American 
theology. If systematic theology provides a comprehensive account of the Christian faith (God 
and humanity, revelation, sin, and salvation), then Pinn attempts to do the same for non-Christian 
and nontheistic orientations. He turns to quotidian spaces such as coffeehouses and barbershops 
for the sources of his theology. In turn, he derives the norms for his theology from the 
community, which he characterizes as a “centering category.” I shall have more to say about 
community momentarily. First, I should note that Pinn’s systematic nontheistic theology, his 
atheology, includes an account of the complex subjectivity of the humanist self that presumably 
flourishes within the humanist community he envisions, an aesthetic that centers on symmetry, 
an ethics, and an important account of the ritual life of humanists—the actions, doing and 
making, associated with humanist beliefs. Each of these elements is interesting in its own right 
and merits individualized attention. 
As Pinn conceives it, humanist community succeeds and supersedes God as the center of gravity 
and existential orientation (Pinn 2012: 30). Drawing on Benedict Anderson’s notion of 
“imagined communities,” Pinn seeks to avoid essentialist notions. Rather than describing this 
humanist community directly, he pursues a strategy of indirection and negation: a kind of via 
negativa. Neither Martin Luther King’s beloved community nor Howard Thurman’s inwardness-
within-community, Pinn’s humanist community eludes direct and positive description (36–40). 
While appreciating his desire to avoid essentialism, one can fairly ask whether this elusiveness is 
a distinguishing aspect of humanist community or Pinn’s failure to describe it adequately. I find 
it odd that Pinn uses what amounts to an apophatic theological strategy to describe a central 
feature of his atheology. In doing so, he comes close to making humanist community ineffable. 
If apophatic theists claim (often for dogmatic reasons) that we cannot speak directly about God, 
then Pinn makes the same claim about humanist community. He mimics in an unhelpful way the 
theocentric theologies he criticizes. While I respect Pinn’s ethical qualms regarding exclusions 
and premature closure, it must be acknowledged that everything we say is contaminated by its 
other and can potentially lead to affirmations we abhor. However, we cannot describe matters of 
importance such as secular humanist community without running the risk of essentializing. For 
the benefit of fellow travelers, Pinn needs to take the risk. 
I conclude this section on Pinn with a comparative note on my perspective as a one percenter. If 
a mode of inquiry denies the mind-independent reality gods and God (g/God), then why call it 
theology? To many ears, a “nontheistic theology” sounds like an oxymoron. But Pinn insists that 
it is not. Theology is not owned by theists. On his humanist definition, “Theology is a method for 
critically engaging, articulating and discussing the deep existential  and ontological issues 
endemic to human life” (Pinn 2012: 6). If we agree, as I do, that these kinds of concerns are 
unavoidable for most normally developed adult Homo sapiens, then it should not matter that 
nontheistic theology sounds oxymoronic. The problem of intelligibility has less to do with the 
sounds Pinn makes than with what listeners have been trained to hear. Yet, I find it difficult to 
regard my own work as theological. Pinn was trained as a theologian. I was trained as a critical 
theorist of religion, an interdisciplinary orientation that represents an ethical-political sublation 
(Aufhebung) of Christian ethics and expresses dissatisfaction with a philosophy of religion that 
was little more than a valet for theology. This orientation developed within the interstices of 
theology, philosophy, and the various critical and postcritical discourses of the last few decades. 
So I resist the appellation “theologian” even though Pinn and I crisscross much of the same 
territory. 
Atheism as a Political Orientation 
Michael Lackey explores expressions of atheism in the texts of Frantz Fanon, J. Saunders 
Redding, Richard Wright, Nella Larsen, and Langston Hughes, among others. His analysis is 
driven by the conviction that theism is a political problem for African Americans: 
Instead of recognizing that they will achieve personal and communal agency only when 
they become creators and definers of “knowledge,” “laws,” and the “political,” believers 
according to African American atheists, accept their culture’s “truth” as God-created 
truth. Such a situation places believers in a passive position with regard to knowledge, 
not realizing that those truths “man himself has wrought,” as Redding claims. And as 
Hughes consistently notes in his fiction, “in believing in God and His truth, believers are 
actually at the epistemic mercy of those who politically control the economic means of 
production. . . . In sum, what African American atheists want their readers to know and 
understand is this: God and his laws are, as [Zora Neale] Hurston claims, creatures of the 
human mind, and since humans are governed by the selfish hand,” the god and laws that 
humans create will reflect their selfish interest, needs, and desires. Therefore instead of 
allowing themselves to be ruled by some pregiven law of being, Hurston, Wright, 
Hughes, and Redding implicitly urge the black community to recognize that God is a 
human creation and therefore to take control of their lives either by creating God and 
God-truths or by abolishing God altogether. (Lackey 2002: 139) 
Lackey’s conceptual apparatus interests me more than his reading of particular African American 
atheists. This apparatus comprises two concepts: the “epistemological/ontological recursive 
loop,” henceforth EORL, and the quasi-Marxist term the “intellectual means of production.” 
EORL refers to a state of affairs where the dominant group defines what counts as knowledge, 
which underwrites the group’s claims about the nature of things, including the status of 
subdominant groups. Lackey characterizes these groups, respectively, as “believers” and 
“infidels.” As God’s chosen people, believers compose the in-group while infidels constitute the 
out-group. This knowledge and status relation between believer and infidel repetitively generate 
and reinforce each other. Using their epistemic superiority, believers disempower infidels and 
rob them of articulate speech. This “power/knowledge” enables white people (the archetypical 
believers in Lackey’s account) to construct black people as nonhuman. Neither believers nor 
infidels, black atheists are not subject to EORL (Lackey 2002: 12–13). Unlike their theistic kin, 
they know that there is no “God-created truth”—that the very idea is a religious subterfuge of 
white supremacy. 
Colored with hyperbole, Lackey hypothesizes the existence of EORL but provides no 
argumentative support and ignores contrary evidence. He treats the logical consequences of 
concepts as if they were empirical. But one should not confuse the logic of conceptual 
relations—what is true when we abstract from circumstantial considerations—with what actually 
occurs in quotidian life. Circumstance and contingencies stand between idea and event, 
qualifying if not undermining simple causal relations between the two. Marx argued that the 
ideas of the ruling class are the ruling ideas. This is certainly true. But those ideas are neither 
absolute nor irresistible. Contra Lackey, black theists even when enslaved and illiterate do not 
behave like cowed subjects of the dominant discourse regarding God and truth. While subject to 
the ruling ideas, they are not merely the playthings of those who control the “intellectual means 
of production.” Under the regime of chattel slavery, the master class explicitly constructed the 
god concept and related ideas according to white supremacist codes. Yet, slaves managed to 
resist and negotiate dominant theological ideas by offering counternarratives. As Stuart Hall has 
long argued, disseminating ideas always entails processes of encoding and decoding. No matter 
how dominant, no group can guarantee that the message sent will be the message received. 
Blackamericans decoded slavery-justifying theological codes in light of their communal 
interests. Signifying on the master’s narrative, they often constructed god and justice in 
ways that subverted the racist codes of those who subjugated them. Thus the message they 
received was not the message masters sent. Blackamericans do not merely consume signs like a 
person with a deficient and nondiscriminating sense of taste; they create and interpret signs also. 
Thus the notion of an irresistible “intellectual means of production”—that fills all the interpretive 
gaps, undermines every attempt at “negotiating meaning,” eliminates every line of creative 
escape and thus renders black theists signless, devoid of semiotic agency—is nonsensical and 
ahistorical. Rather than argue for theology, I accent the subtlety and sophistication required to 
prosecute the case against it. My point underscores the magnitude of the task of those who seek 
to refute theism rather than to deconstruct or circumvent it. By advancing an argument any 
sophisticated theist can rebut, Lackey undercuts his own advocacy. A robust atheism must avoid 
dogmatism and mimetic rivalry. Otherwise theism and atheism are rightly viewed as two faces of 
the same dogmatic problem. A dogmatic approach such as this leads readers like me to conclude 
that they are neither theists nor atheists. 
Lackey should be praised for placing black atheism in dialogue with a broad range of 
philosophers and other critical thinkers. In this regard, he is more philosophically expansive and 
adventurous than Jones. But his account lacks the focus, the command of the subject matter, and 
the rigor of Jones’s analysis.4 My primary criticism of Lackey concerns his failure to make good 
on the implicit promise that he would outline the productive relationship between atheism and 
political liberation. He assumes what he needs to demonstrate: that atheism has a progressive, 
liberationist, and democratic politics. I doubt he can demonstrate what he assumes. Affirming or 
denying the reality of g/God5 does not entail specific political orientations. (Antonio Gramsci, 
the Italian Marxist, was an atheist; so was Ayn Rand, the libertarian proponent of unconstrained 
capitalism, of Atlas “shrugging” off the burdens of government.) Lackey’s suggestion to the 
contrary, reactionaries and revolutionaries, racists and antiracists, proponents of foundationalist 
epistemologies and critics, all are, collectively, on both sides of the theism–atheism divide. In the 
language of that great atheist and political revolutionary Karl Marx, the theism–atheism couplet 
mystifies the real issue: under the right circumstances, or the wrong ones as the case may be, 
humans do terrible things to each other, to animals, and to the ecology. Theism and atheism are 
existential orientations that broadly frame how we make sense of things. They are habits of 
thought, not genetic signals or algorithms that strictly determine what we do. Neither theism nor 
atheism can substitute for the hard work of ethical-political thinking. Too often, Lackey relies on 
the mere invocation and incantation of atheism to do the ethical-political work that it (like 
theism) cannot do. 
Three cheers for Lackey. Though he fails to establish his central claim adequately, African 
American Atheists and Political Liberation is an ambitious work and represents another 
milestone in one percenter thinking. 
Gender, Imperialism, and Race 
The term one percenter should not be taken literally. The category may comprise more than 1 
percent of the African American population. But it is hard to know the actual number of atheists, 
secular humanists, and naturalists. Some may be posing, “passing for theists,” living closeted 
lives, or otherwise hiding. In fifteenth-century Iberia, Jews were often forced to convert to 
Christianity under intense pressure from a bigoted, inquisitorial establishment. Called Marranos 
and Conversos, they were often suspected of practicing Judaism in secret. There were various 
efforts by the church to root them out. Insofar as these converts were in fact secret Jews, Jews in 
Christian garb, they are an apt metaphor for one percenters in hiding. I suspect that many one 
percenters live lives of quiet desperation within or on the borders of black churches and other 
places of worship. They are forced to be there by social pressure within black communities 
where religion, especially Christianity, is regarded as a constitutive element of authentic black 
identity. On this view, normative black identity is Christian blackness or, minimally, theistic 
blackness. So they genuflect without conviction before the gods of their fathers and the gods of 
their tribe. These black Conversos are converts in reverse. They fear revealing themselves, 
declaring who they are lest they be censored and even ostracized in a society where the black 
church is an institutional center of black life and white supremacy is an enduring reality. 
No one addresses this reality more effectively than Sikivu Hutchinson. In Moral Combat: Black 
Atheists, Gender Politics, and the Values War, she presents the most concrete, wide-ranging, and 
accessible account of the kind of thinking and doing characteristic of one percenters. Though a 
scholar by training, she bids us to descend from the lofty heights of academic discourses to the 
valleys that often circumscribe the world of everyday black life. Unlike the male one percenters I 
have canvassed thus far, the perspectives of proponents of gender justice and feminism explicitly 
drive Hutchinson’s analysis. To summarize her views, God, religion, and church are blights on 
African American life. They superintend and reinforce a pathological entanglement of predatory 
masculinity, the denigration of black women, dogmatism, and anti-intellectualism that are 
inimical to the interests of African Americans. This diagnosis is true despite the fact that the 
black church has often been a site of solidarity and resistance within a white supremacist society. 
However much her claims may offend, they seem manifestly true to me and noncontroversial 
from an evidence-based perspective. 
Hutchinson provides plenty of evidence in support of her claims. The list of horrible things 
include opposition to civil rights for gays and lesbians by prominent black churches; rampant 
homophobia (Hutchinson 2011: 11, 13, 17); the construction of black atheists, especially black 
women as immoral race traitors (20, 38); the increasing commitment among African Americans 
to antichoice views (abortion as black genocide) (82); the widespread denial of Darwinian 
evolution and support for teaching creationism in public schools (89, 118); and “some of the 
most negative views of atheists among all groups” (103). Hutchinson remarks: “The socially 
conservative tenor of African American communities has marginalized skeptical, agnostic, or 
atheist analyses of black politics and culture” (126). Too often, she argues, churches are little 
more than schools of bigotry. These are her most salient points. 
Buffeted by black cultural conservatism on their far right, one percenters are also constrained on 
their near right by the impervious and patronizing attitude of white atheists. Hutchinson remarks 
that “many white atheists and humanists believe that just being an atheist magically exempts 
them from the institutionally racist belief systems and practices of the dominant culture” (213). 
To this point, she adds: “As delineated by many white nonbelievers the New Atheism preserves 
and reproduces the status quo of white supremacy in its arrogant insularity. In this universe, 
oppressed minorities are more imperiled by their own investment in organized religion than 
white supremacy. Liberation is not a matter of fighting against white racism, sexism, and 
classism but of throwing off the shackles of superstition” (218). This is part of a withering 
critique that Hutchinson levels against the New (White) Atheists who fail to make opposition to 
racism, gender injustice, and imperialism a constitutive part of their antitheism. From all this, we 
draw an important conclusion: white supremacy, antiracism, and the whole array of pernicious 
hierarchies are on both sides of the theism–atheism divide. They do not disappear merely 
because God has. 
By explicitly wedding antitheism to gender justice, antiracism, and anti-imperialism, Hutchinson 
achieves a milestone in one percenter thought. 
Pragmatic Naturalism and the 1 Percent 
Why is naturalism difficult to embrace? Is the cost of that embrace a certain irremediable 
sadness? In the following passage, George Santayana poses questions that no thoughtful one 
percenter can evade: 
All certain knowledge seems to describe material laws, yet a deified nature has generally 
inspired a religion of melancholy. Why should the only intelligible philosophy seem to 
defeat reason and the chief means of benefiting mankind seem to blast our best hopes? . . 
. Whence this persistent search for invisible regions and powers and for metaphysical 
explanations that can explain nothing . . . Why is that sensuous optimism we may call 
Greek, or that industrial optimism we may call American, such a thin disguise for 
despair? . . . Why has man’s conscience in the end invariably rebelled against naturalism 
and reverted in some form or other to a cultus of the unseen? (Santayana 1936: 3:149–50) 
Without a doubt, naturalism entails the loss of the metaphysical comforts associated with 
religion. Gone is the notion of a transcendent intelligent power that ensures cosmic justice in 
some time beyond temporality, a divine observer who watches over us, whose interest, 
knowledge, and attentiveness give our existence meaning and significance: “the fellow sufferer 
who understands” (Whitehead 1979: 351), our father and mother. The loss of these notions 
produces sadness. Thus, Santayana introduces this passage from The Life of Reason under the 
section heading: “Naturalism sad” (Santayana 1936: 3:149). 
How does a naturalist deal with this loss and sadness? One acknowledges the loss and embraces 
the life it makes possible. The following affirmations capture the naturalistic sensibility quite 
well: Homo sapiens are gods who shit (Becker 1997: 58); “Religion is the love of life in the 
consciousness of impotence” (Santayana 1936: 3:38). Proud of her powers but conscious of 
powerlessness in the face of death, the pragmatic naturalist rejects every manner of denial and 
recognizes the unavoidable sadness that shadows life. Death is the ultimate horizon of life. We 
die. I, as this particular individual, shall die. Despite the illusion that we are like gods, bear the 
image of god, have godlike cognitive and moral capacities that make us categorically different 
than other animals, Homo sapiens, human animals, shit, succumb to disease, grow old, and die. 
Pragmatic naturalists love life in the consciousness of impotence, affirm transitory joys amidst 
persistent-all-too-persistent sorrows, and pursue justice in a world where many injustices are 
never acknowledged much less remediated and most victims die anonymously. This is not 
Nietzsche’s amorfati (love of fate). Whether grudging or affirmative, the pragmatic naturalist is 
not a fatalist of any sort. But she does acknowledge the radical contingencies that characterize 
human existence. She regards the human-all-too-human experiences of disappointment, dread, 
defeat, disease as intimations of death, and dehumanizing oppression. These experiences remind 
us of the imperfections and unsatisfactoriness at the foundation of all things. We shit, literally sit 
on a pile of excrement (the putrefaction within), which symbolizes the fact, smell, and 
consciousness of death. Pragmatic naturalism begins here. 
This is not to suggest that humans do not imagine themselves as more than animals. Nor is it to 
suggest that humans do not have evolved capacities, including the ability to consciously 
manipulate evolutionary processes, which causes us to fit oddly within the animal kingdom and 
to stand out in the most conspicuous manner. We do have capacities that make us highly 
distinctive, so much so that we can imagine ourselves as godlike. We can imagine a spiritualized 
destiny complete with nonmaterial bodies (without moist and smelly orifices) where our 
animality has been left behind. Our spiritualizing imagination notwithstanding, we kill and eat, 
shit and stink: earthly reminders of the realities that circumscribe our transcendent fantasies. 
Thus Ernest Becker’s memorable phrase: man is “a god who shits” (1997: 58). Humans have a 
transcendent, sign-enabled imagination tethered to ravenous jaws and foul anuses. The most 
transcendent and predatory of species (apex predators), humans are paradoxical animals. That is 
who we are. 
What could be more comical, more side-splittingly hilarious than a god who shits? And so, the 
naturalist finds herself laughing through all the shit, all the way to grave. Yes, naturalism is sad, 
but it is funny as hell too. Even for a death-bound subject, laughter reveals a certain “lightness of 
being.” Behind the laughter lies a dialectical interplay of piety and impiety. The naturalist 
acknowledges finitude and the contingences that condition, position, and bear down on us.6 But 
she refuses to consecrate them, to make those necessities and contingencies holy. 
As I remarked before with respect to atheism and secular humanism, naturalism is neither an 
ethics nor a politics. It may proscribe certain orientations such as divine command ethics and 
theocratic politics but does not prescribe a specific ethical-political orientation. Those one 
percenters who think they have done the necessary ethical-political work merely by declaring 
their nontheistic beliefs are mistaken. Only intentional acts of articulation can consummate and 
sustain the marriage of naturalism and emancipatory forms of ethics and politics. As a naturalist, 
I am committed to this marriage. This commitment entails precisely the antiracist, 
antiimperialist, and pro-gender justice orientations that Hutchinson describes. (Crosscutting these 
three commitments is the struggle against an international division of labor governed by 
neoliberal priorities.) While one percenters may, as an empirical matter, be biased toward these 
progressive orientations, this is not an issue of necessity. One percenters may very well exhibit 
the aristocratic sensibility of a Nietzsche with his antidemocratic celebration of the “pathos of 
distance” or the “free” market-deifying orientation of an Ayn Rand with her distinction between 
“creators” and “parasites.”7 Or, in contrast, they might manifest the escapist and defeatist 
nihilism of Cross Damon in Richard Wright’s The Outsider. As one percenters, we forget these 
nonoptimal possibilities at our own peril. 
One percenters speak the same language. Atheism, secular humanism, and naturalism are 
different accents or, at the extremes, dialects, within a common language. All one percenters 
deny the mind-independent reality of g/God. But they may very well draw different inferences 
from this common denial. As a preferential option, should we minimize the dangers that theism 
poses to black communities or accent the absurdity of god talk? While it is doubtful that any one 
percenter regards these options as mutually exclusive, questions such as these reveal the 
inferential differences between defanging and debunking strategies. Pragmatic sincerity 
represents an overlapping and competing strategy: a third mode of self-presentation among one 
percenters. Having sucked the marrow from the bones of skepticism, the pragmatic naturalist is 
sincerely ironic.8 Her irony is so thick that some might accuse her of bad faith, of passing as a 
theist, of being a modern-day Marrano. 
To illustrate this possibility, I shall adopt a first- rather than a third-person perspective since it is 
directly related to the claims I make. I describe myself variously as a naturalist, pragmatic 
naturalist, pragmatic religious naturalist, and naturalistic Christian. I can imagine the following 
responses: Isn’t the very idea of a naturalistic Christian an oxymoron? If, as a rebuttable 
presumption, Pinn’s nontheistic theology is oxymoronic, then isn’t naturalistic Christianity even 
more so? Why would a naturalist call himself a Christian? Is he confused? Is he making some 
kind of category mistake? Isn’t Christianity nature transcendent? These are fair questions. 
To address them, I draw on Søren Kierkegaard’s distinction between the ethical-religious 
orientations of resignation and faith. One might speak of the naturalistic Christian as 
Kierkegaard does of the knight of faith: “He goes to church. No heavenly gaze or any sign of the 
incommensurable betrays him; if one did not know him, it would be impossible to distinguish 
him from the rest of the crowd, for at most his hearty and powerful singing of the hymns proves 
that he has good lungs” (Kierkegaard 1983: 39). Like Kierkegaard’s knight of faith, who is so 
nondescript as to be indistinguishable 
from any other bourgeois philistine (39) within a decadent Christendom, the naturalistic 
Christian may resemble the theist beside him in the pews. Here, to pour the irony even more 
thickly, the naturalistic Christian occasionally attends church. But why would he do this? I call 
myself a naturalistic Christian because I was shaped by a Christian habitus—that is, I was 
socialized hearing, reading, and reciting Christian stories, singing Christian songs, participating 
in forms of bodily deportment and a “structure of feeling” (Williams 1978: 133–34)9 associated 
with the black church. Thus I am the product of what Theo Smith describes as the biblical 
formation of black American identity (Smith 1994). But my formation is not exactly as Smith 
describes. I am attached to biblical stories in the same way that I am connected to the Iliad and 
the Odyssey. In both cases, the gods are literary characters. Whether well or poorly crafted, their 
import is merely poetic. Like the baby ghost in Toni Morrison’s Beloved, they make the stories 
more interesting. 
These stories expand my imagination and ethical rhetoric. In addition to aesthetic and 
tropological attachments, there are practical connections also. I live cheek-to-jowl with 
Christians. My family and “some of my best friends” are theists. So in the presence of those I 
love, I act out these attachments on my own terms. When I sing spirituals or hymns, I am 
Kierkegaard’s nondescript, bourgeois philistine-appearing knight of faith turned inside out.10 To 
“turn out” a knight of faith is to deny the mind-independent reality of g/God, to affirm that 
traditional religion gets things backwards: that humans create and g/God is their creature. So my 
rejoinder to the charge of bad faith is this: I am neither ignorant of what I really think nor self-
deceived. I am not hiding the truth or hiding from the truth. Beneatha Younger in A Raisin in the 
Sun puts it well: “There simply is no blasted God—there is only man and it is he who makes 
miracles!” (Hansberry 2004: 51). 
g/God is a miracle of the human imagination: the greatest and most sublime character Homo 
sapiens has ever invented. This miracle comes complete with ceremonial behaviors. Like those 
associated with the nation-state—singing the national anthem, displaying, saluting, and handling 
the flag—the rituals of theism and religious life are sometimes hokey. And yet, by demanding 
specific forms of bodily comportment, they produce aptitudes and virtues that are subject 
formative in ways the naturalist approves (Asad 1993: 62, 72). While refusing behaviors that 
reinforce dispositions we abhor (such as kneeling, head bowed, hands clasped in supplication 
before king and god), the naturalist claims ownership of the ceremonial, rite, and ritual 
commonwealth that Homo sapiens have created. The naturalist remakes, reconstructs, and 
reoccupies these practices for her own purposes.11 In this regard, consider Santayana’s remark 
that “prayer is a soliloquy” (Santayana 1936: 4:30). On this naturalistic view, when people pray 
they engage in an expressive rather than a utilitarian act; in short, they whisper in their own ear. 
Talking to oneself can be therapeutic. There is no principled reason why one percenters should 
not avail themselves of this old form of autosuggestion in which we talk to ourselves as if we 
were talking to someone else. What could be more natural? Cutting through the overlapping but 
divergent evolution of Homo sapiens as biological organisms and as cultural beings, our 
semiotic, linguistic, and symbolic capacities underwrite Santayana’s naturalistic understanding 
of prayer. 
These evolved capacities also allow us to imagine counterfactual realities such as the “ought” of 
ethical judgments (this rather than that ought to be the case) and to partially realize them, to 
make them facts in the world. Ethics and politics are among the ways that Homo sapiens have 
made life more livable. Bound up in complex ways with both, religion is a way of making life 
livable. Bees make honey, birds build nests, and spiders spin webs of beauty and death. Humans 
create g/God: the nasty, the naughty, and the nice; the one and the many; the “one true God” and 
all the “false gods.” These creations make life a bit sweeter (or bitter, as the case may be); 
making things more intense and interesting, they relieve our boredom, provide a place to nest, 
and create a world of beauty and death. Religions are beautiful and deadly. As with the spider’s 
web, their beauty and lethality are intimately connected. Like the nation-state and war, you can’t 
have one without the other. The consequences of religion are morally ambiguous. Like their 
atheist and secular humanist comrades, naturalists seek to debunk and defang bad forms of 
religion. As 1 percent of the Blackamerican population, they engage in a Gramscian war of 
position, an effort to make the one percenter alternative hegemonic. Through a sincere though 
ironic engagement, the 1 percent strives to occupy, subvert, and transform the 99 percent. (This 
is an act of pragmatic sincerity, which sublates standard forms of pragmatic irony.) This may be 
a utopian goal, but a one percenter’s reach should exceed her grasp. Indeed, “this worldly” 
transformation and Deweyan reconstruction (see Dewey 2012) may be the only proper use of 
Robert Browning’s heaven. 
By way of conclusion, I reiterate an earlier claim: atheism, secular humanism, and naturalism are 
not an ethics or a politics. The connection between one’s identity as a one percenter and a 
specific ethical-political orientation must be an intentional act. This orientation is forged through 
the life you live, the choices you make, the associations you maintain or abandon, and the allies 
and the enemies that you cultivate. There are many choices. At this present historical 
conjuncture, where poverty properly commands much of our attention, two issues that I find 
particularly compelling are penal slavery and sex slavery. Gendered in their targets, effects, and 
notoriety, mass incarceration and a coercive sex trade harm black communities 
disproportionately. Predatory labor and capital markets and gangsterism among the political class 
underwrite these harms. These issues among others ought to fire the ethical-political energies of 
one percenters. 
I will not say that the future of black religion belongs to one percenters. However, one percenters 
certainly belong to the future of black religion. 
Notes 
1 I should note that an updated version of Lamarckism called epigenetics has gained credibility 
among evolutionary geneticists. 
2 See Cone 1975. Specifically, see the chapter “Divine Liberation and Black Suffering,” where 
Cone attempts to respond to Jones’s devastating critique. 
3 Humanism, religious humanism, and secular humanism are often used in ambiguous ways that 
permit considerable slippage and play. 
4 Lackey has difficulty synthesizing the disparate figures he cites, does not recognize important 
tensions among them, or the implications of their views for the claims he wishes to make. For 
example, toward the end of the book, he calls for a democratic politics of God. Yet elsewhere he 
seems to accept Hurston’s Nietzscheanesque claim that theism/Christianity and democracy are 
two sides of the same baneful reality. The Heideggerian-derived antihumanism that he outlines in 
chapter two dissolves into a fairly conventional humanism. 
5 Regarding the terms god and God, I have a polemical aim and wish to express it in what I 
write. “[M]y use of ‘God’ is purposefully unconventional and inconsistent. Despite convention, I 
regard the English word God as a proper name for the Christian god and thus as a false generic. I 
take the generic and the proper name to be one and the same as a matter of practice. I signal my 
distrust of the convention by not capitalizing the word except where it is the first word in a 
sentence, when quoting others, or for emphasis. When referring to ‘God and the gods,’ I use the 
construction‘g/God’” (Hart 2011: ix–x). 
6 Charles Darwin’s account of evolution, Martin Heidegger’s notion of “thrownness,” Michel 
Foucault’s account of the discourses that constitute and position us as subjects, and James 
Gustafson’s account of the powers that pressure us capture what I have in mind. 
7 I should note that this distinction is one that Rand puts in the mouth of Howard Roark, a 
character in The Fountainhead. As a general rule, one should not blur the difference between the 
views of an author and the views she attributes to a character. In Rand’s case, however, the 
conflation of author and character is a fair representation of her views. 
8 For Common Things: Irony, Trust, and Commitment in America Today (Purdy 1999) is a 
powerful critique of irony. I find much of Jedediah Purdy’s argument compelling. Nonetheless, I 
am not willing to abandon irony because of the positive work that it does. Using irony is worth 
the risk of succumbing to all the things that Purdy rightly condemns. My irony is quite sincere. 
See Willson (2013). I also recommend Cynthia Willett (2008), Irony in the Age of Empire: 
Comic Perspective on Democracy and Freedom. Willett remarks, “Queer send-ups of our sexual 
identities challenge, disrupt, and disorient not just the coercive policies of the state or 
discriminatory rules and practices of civil society, but also socio-psychological norms such as 
heterosexuality” (133). The ironic concept of the “naturalistic Christian” has a disruptive and 
disorienting place in my account of black identity. 
9 Williams speaks primarily of emergent forms of art and literature, but I take his claims as 
relevant to mine. 
10 I am making a point, not claiming to have the virtues of a knight. 
11 Here I have John Dewey’s notion of reconstruction and Hans Blumenberg’s notion of 
reoccupation in mind. 
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